This chapter identifies some themes in British idealism, especially those which resonate in contemporary debates, through an examination of T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley and J.M.E. McTaggart. It focuses primarily on metaphysics and epistemology, supplemented by discussion of the ethics of Green and Bradley. In characterizing British idealism in more detail, it is important to start with T.H. Green, whose importance lay both in his philosophical thought, and also in his active engagement with Oxford local politics, educational standards and school reform, (...) and issues of social justice, the common good and the recognition theory of rights. Green's major philosophical monograph, published posthumously in 1883, was Prolegomena to Ethics. This can be seen as a broadly Kantian account of the presuppositions of knowledge. The two main claims that concern us here are, first, that the real consists in relations and, secondly, that the related whole constitutes an “eternal consciousness”. (shrink)

R G Collingwood is an important twentieth century historian, archaeologist and philosopher whose works are the subject of continued interest, analysis and study. There is an unquestionable need to support this research activity with the provision of a reference guide which is fully up-to-date, informed and authoritative. The Companion will therefore list all primary and secondary material relevant to the study of Collingwood in all his fields of expertise - historical theory, philosophy and archaeology. It will also provide a guide (...) to archive material relevant to his life, together with sources and locations. The resulting volume will provide an essential companion to the understanding of the life and thought of R G Collingwood. (shrink)

This book assesses the respective prospects of two competing methodological approaches to the study of meaning and communication, as well as truth and inference, each figuring prominently within the analytic tradition of philosophy of language. It defends the later Wittgenstein’s "phenomenological" methodological approach, over the "logistical" methodological approach characteristic of the early analytic philosophers.

Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein’s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ‘p’ is true and p in §136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the (...) so-called ‘private language argument’, wherein Wittgenstein provides an expressivist treatment of first-person present tense sensation utterances. In this paper, by contrast, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is best understood as endorsing neither a non-factualism about sensation utterances, nor a deflationism about truth. Wittgenstein should instead be understood as offering a ‘mixed’ view of sensation utterances according to which some while not others are apt for expressivist treatment. Moreover, he should be thought of as identifying truth-conditions with semantic ‘correctness-conditions’, and thus truth with semantic ‘assertibility’. (shrink)

This book argues that Collingwood developed a complete political philosophy of civilization. It also demonstrates that his philosophical work comprises a unity in which there is no fundamental discontinuity between his earlier and later writings.

Abstract:Recent years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in the precise nature of Wittgenstein’s fateful but notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, levelled as Russell was furiously composing Theory of Knowledge in May–June 1913. In this paper, I place special expository focus on two controversial documents from the relevant period, whose nature and interrelationships to this point have been inadequately understood in the literature. The first document is a set of working notes composed by Russell (...) under the title “Props”—which I date as on or shortly after 26 May—while the second is a June 1913 letter from Wittgenstein to Russell, often thought to contain a “paralyzing”, if mysterious, objection to Russell’s theory. On the basis of a new interpretation of these two documents and their relationship, I revise the “standard reading” of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. The revision renders that reading invulnerable to certain seemingly devastating criticisms developed by Stevens in 2003. I defend my revised reading against various “non-standard” alternatives which have flourished in the recent literature, in part as the result of Stevens’ criticisms. (shrink)

abstract In what follows I respond to Henry Shue's paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the uses (...) to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood is not normally associated with analytic philosophy, neither negatively nor positively. He neither regarded himself, nor was regarded by his contemporaries and their successors, as an analytical philosopher. However, the story is more interestingly complex than this, both because Collingwood is one of the few pre-analytics in the UK who continues to be of interest to current analytical philosophers, especially in relation to the philosophy of art and history and his conception of metaphysics, and because he mounted a (...) critique of analytical philosophy in the years of its emergence. (shrink)

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

This paper considers whether respect is a concept that can be applied fruitfully and cogently to nature and the environment. Through an examination of the idea of nature, respect and an analysis of Paul Taylor’s book Respect for Nature, it argues that, despite the attractiveness of the idea, the concept of respect cannot be coherently and systematically applied to the natural world and that, if a reasoned justification for a non-instrumental view of nature is to be sought, it must be (...) sought elsewhere, perhaps in the notion of care rather than respect per se. (shrink)

In so far as Collingwood is branded an ‘idealist’, the corresponding assumption is that he subscribed to the broad themes associated with the ‘English idealists or Hegelians’; in so far as he is thought to have broken free from their pernicious influence he is regarded as a proto-Kuhn or Wittgenstein who saw the error of his early ways. This paper suggests that neither picture is fully accurate, and that while the figure of F.H. Bradley perhaps played a more significant part (...) in Collingwood’s philosophical development than is often recognised, his role was that of a spur or challenge to his thinking. Coming to terms with Bradley was a struggle throughout his philosophical career. I suggest that Collingwood took from Bradley the dual problematic of the method appropriate to philosophical thought and the tangled question of the nature of metaphysics. These were both problems which he wrestled with throughout his life, and Bradley’s work can be seen as setting the agenda for his thought on these matters. (shrink)

The extensive literature on the Learning Organisation proposes that a competitive advantage can be achieved through the systematised generation and application of knowledge. Consequently, much of the debate concerns the processes, routines and organisational features that a firm should adopt to learn more, and faster, than its competitors. Less attention is given to understanding the nature of the knowledge that is created by these Learning Organisations. We hold that the topic is more important than its current weight in the literature (...) because the performance claims of the models proposed critically depend upon the newly acquired knowledge replacing ignorance or knowledge with less utility. In this paper we explore the nature of knowledge that Learning Organisation theory seeks to create by articulating implicit epistemological assumptions found within the literature. We show that the capacities of each epistemology to help an organisation reject falsehood and make greater use of its knowledge are critically undermined by these very routines. The paper concludes by highlighting the importance of a sceptical epistemology and outlines a process that would strengthen doubting behaviour. (shrink)

This volume brings together academics from a variety of disciplines to discuss Collingwood's contributions to philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of history, political philosophy and archaeological theory. It begins with a general survey of his contribution to history, politics and philosophy.

This book offers a critical analysis, both theoretical and practical, of ethics education in the military. In the twenty-first century, it has become increasingly important to ensure that the armed forces of Western and other democracies fight justly and behave ethically. The 'good soldier' has to be not only professionally skilled but morally intelligent. At a time of relentless media scrutiny, the publicising of incidents of morally and legally unacceptable behaviour, such as the gross mistreatment of prisoners and the torture (...) of suspected terrorists, can do much to undermine the credibility of those who claim to hold the moral high ground in any particular conflict. Written by an international team of academic theorists and military practitioners, this volume provides inter-disciplinary insights into the present state, and the future, of ethics education in the militaries of Western democracies. The contributors critically address the central question of whether such education is sufficient to prepare members of the armed forces to face the peculiar challenges of conflict environments that are now primarily 'wars among the people', in which the opposing combatants may have little or no regard for human life and fail to discriminate between soldiers and civilians when choosing their targets. Drawing lessons from recent examples of unethical conduct, this original book offers insightful and constructive advice, both theoretical and practical, as to how situations can be improved and on the means that could and should be employed towards this end. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, ethics and international relations."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

R.G.Collingwood's Autobiography is the next of Collingwood's books to be revised for a new edition by Oxford University Press.It will include new manuscript material, include his Log of a Journey to the East Indies In addition there will be a number of scholarly essays relating Collingwood's ideas to his life and broader concerns.It is opportune to make available in English two introductions to the German and Romanian editions of An Autobiography.

This new edition of Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method contains several previously unpublished papers including Collingwood's correspondence with Gilbert Ryle.

This volume is devoted to a critical discussion and re-appraisal of the work of Anglo-American Idealists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Idealism was the dominant philosophy in Britain and the entire English-speaking world during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The British Idealists made important contributions to logic, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind. Their legacy awaits further exploration and reassessment, and (...) this book is a contribution to this task. The essays in this collection display many aspects of contemporary concern with idealistic philosophy: they range from treatments of logic to consideration of the Absolute, personal idealism, the philosophy of religion, philosophy of art, philosophy of action, and moral and political philosophy. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the work of the Anglo-American Idealists has once again been widely discussed and re-considered, and new pathways of research and investigation have been opened. (shrink)

Had I not read that book in the months leading up to my university finals I might never have gained that real enthusiasm and excitement for ideas which has possessed me ever since. Before that time I played with the academic world in a desultory fashion, moving the thoughts, thinkers and theories in front of me as though they were merely so many counters. After I read Collingwood everything changed, and I believe the same can be true for any of (...) its readers. (shrink)

Collingwood's review of F.J. Teggart's Theory of History is predominantly critical. Teggart gets short shrift for over-voluminous extensive quoting at the expense of developing his major theses, his methodological confusion and his inadequate metaphysics -- the conceptions of 'event' and 'process' he relies on being the chief culprits.

‘The doubtful story of successive events’. With these words Bernard Bosanquet is often taken to have damned historical knowledge to oblivion. Although it is undeniably true that Bosanquet uttered these words and saw them into print, it is much less clear what he intended their import to be and whether he intended to damn history as a form of knowledge as such. Although he wrote little directly which can be construed as ‘philosophy of history’, he developed views both implicitly and (...) explicitly which bear on this question. My concern in this paper is to show that Bosanquet’s animosity to history derived not from a desire to condemn, but from a desire to draw more from history than the historiography of his time would, in good philosophical conscience, allow him to. His words were words of disappointment and despair, of thwarted hope, rather than outright rejection. I shall argue that Bosanquet needed an account of historical experience to flesh out his account of the concrete universal. A re-telling of the story of Bosanquet and history shows how, if it had been possible for him to draw together unresolved strands in his thinking, he could have affirmed historical experience as ‘the heart beat of the absolute’. Following Foster I shall claim that he was ultimately committed to this, but was reluctant or unable to draw it out explicitly from his leading doctrines. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the work of Walter Benjamin in the philosophy of history. It suggests that his work, including the famous ?Theses on the Philosophy of History? contains important insights of interest to those engaged in reflections on history. Benjamin was concerned to argue against what he saw as the distorting effect of certain views in the philosophy of history and a belief in progress which he saw as having damaging practical effects. In this he was quite right. (...) However, the importance of his work lay primarily not in philosophy of history in an analytical sense of the term, but in the substantive sense, that is, the sense in which claims are made concerning the directionality of the historical process. Benjamin sought to show that in this sense of the term, it was important to avoid belief in the necessity of progress. However, I argue that he overstated his case in his determination to avoid a philosophy of history committed to belief in progress. His implicit claim that a merely negative philosophy of history is possible proves to be an illusion because (whether negative or positive), a philosophy of history makes presuppositions about the directionality of history (or its absence) which go beyond the empirical evidence. (shrink)

This is a big book, conceived on a grand scale. Sprigge does not fight shy of addressing the large central issues. He takes James and Bradley head on and expounds their philosophy without compromise and without assuming that the only way we can appreciate them is by making them more palatable to the modern mind by watering down what they wrote. While he relates their thought to modern philosophical concerns he does not presuppose that modern philosophical concerns as such should (...) act as the arbiter of what counts as philosophical good sense. In other words, we can learn from Bradley and James, whether or not they could also learn from us. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to shed light on the use of transcendental deductions, within demonstrations of aspects of Wittgenstein's early semantics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mathematics. I focus on two crucial claims introduced by Wittgenstein within these transcendental deductions, each identified in conversation with Desmond Lee in 1930-31. Specifically, the claims are of the logical independence of elementary propositions, and that infinity is a number. I show how these two, crucial claims are both demonstrated and subsequently deployed by Wittgenstein (...) within a series of transcendental deductions, a series which begins with extensionalism as a generalized condition of sense on propositions, and in the context of which are then derived various, further, significant and unobvious presuppositions generated by that generalized condition of sense. In addition to clearing up deductions of these two, aforementioned claims, I also elucidate deductions of the subsistence of objects, and of logical space as an infinite totality. (shrink)

Politics and the Environment includes chapters on environmental philosophy and ideology, environmental movements, collective action, environment and economics. Each chapter includes real- life examples of pressing problems.

In this article, I pay special expository attention to two pieces of philosophically relevant Wittgenstein–Russell correspondence from the period leading up to the ultimate demise of Russell's Theory of Knowledge manuscript (in June 1913). This is done in the hopes of shedding light on Wittgenstein's notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement. I argue that these two pieces of correspondence (the first, a letter from Wittgenstein to Russell dated January 1913, and the second, a letter from Russell (...) to Ottoline Morrell, reporting a tense confrontation with Wittgenstein on 26 May 1913) each refer to what is more or less the same approach to problems concerning the unity and well-formedness of propositions or judgements. However, the view advanced in Wittgenstein's January letter to Russell nevertheless differs in a key respect from the view of Russell's referred to in the May letter to Morrell. The difference involves Wittgenstein's incorporating qualities and relations as unsaturated parts of the copulae of atomic complexes, where these copulae are in turn conceived as logical forms. Because such an approach to logical form (and more specifically, to relations) was philosophically unpalatable to Russell, he undertook an alternative theoretical correction in the context of his 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript. This theoretical correction was discussed with Wittgenstein during the tense confrontation on 26 May, and involved deploying a supplemental significance constraint on judgements. It was this significance constraint on judgements, moreover, which was the ‘premiss’ alluded to by Wittgenstein in the context of a June 1913 letter to Russell, wherein he claims to express his objection to Russell's theory ‘exactly.’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCollingwood's The New Leviathan is a difficult text. It comprises philosophy, political theory, political opinion and history in what is sometimes an uneasy amalgam. Despite its being the culmination of thirty years of work in ethics and political theory, the final text was clearly affected by the adverse circumstances under which it was written, these largely being Collingwood's illness which increasingly affected his ability to work as the writing of The New Leviathan progressed. This paper seeks to disentangle the composition (...) of the book thereby shedding light on its distinctive character as the last substantial piece of philosophical work published in Collingwood's lifetime. (shrink)